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Abstract 
This paper examines social learning and network effects that are particularly important for online 
videos, considering the limited marketing campaigns of user-generated content. Rather than 
combining both social learning and network effects under the umbrella of social contagion or 
peer influence, we develop a theoretical model and empirically identify social learning and 
network effects separately. Using a unique data set from YouTube, we find that both 
mechanisms have statistically and economically significant effects on video views, and which 
mechanism dominates depends on the specific video type. 
Keywords: Social Learning, Network Effects, User-Generated Content, Social Contagion, Social 
Media 
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“You’ve got to create images they won’t accept. Make them foam at the mouth. Force 
them to understand that they’re living in a pretty queer world.” 
— Andre Malraux, “Picasso Mask” (1976), page 110.                                                   
“A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention.” 
— Herbert A. Simon, (1982), page 40.     
1. INTRODUCTION 
With new products such as consumer goods, food, pharmaceutical goods, financial 
services, and movies constantly flooding the markets, consumers face an already 
overwhelmingly large and rapidly growing choice set. Meanwhile, with the prolific use of social 
media, consumers obtain information about products from social sources in the forms of product 
reviews and friends’ recommendations. Therefore, marketers tend to use these forms of social 
contagion to influence consumers’ perception and behavior.  
Several studies have shown the presence of social contagion in new product adoption 
(e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 2009; Goldenberg et al. 2009; Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Valente 
2011; Katona, Zubcsek, and Sarvary 2011). We aim to take a step further to test different 
mechanisms of social contagion: How are individuals’ decisions affected by their peers? In our 
context, social contagion happens mainly through two channels: (1) Social learning, the process 
in which consumers obtain knowledge about a product’s quality through peers (Tucker and 
Zhang 2011); (2) Network effect, the phenomenon that the value of a product increases as the 
number of its users increases (Katz and Shapiro 1985). Which mechanism exists or dominates 
depends on the specific product in question. When choosing a mobile network operator, network 
effects may dominate because of free mobile-to-mobile calling. When purchasing an HDTV, 
social learning becomes the primary force because consumers are mainly concerned with quality. 
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The two mechanisms have different implications for marketing strategies: For products with 
strong network effects, creating a large user base is crucial in attracting new adopters. In contrast, 
generating positive word-of-mouth (WOM) is the key for products with prevailing social 
learning.  
In this study, we differentiate between social learning and network effects for social 
media content consumption, especially in the context of YouTube, the largest online video 
sharing website. Selecting online videos to watch is one of the most common choices viewers 
make every day. According to ComScore, the average user spend about 43 minutes watching 
online videos in June 2013, and Google websites (primarily YouTube) account for 
approximately 40% of that time, about 17 minutes.
1
 According to YouTube statistics, 100 hours 
of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute. What these numbers mean is that, given the 
vast reservoir of online videos, choosing videos to watch can become a complicated issue. On 
the one hand, consumers receive various information from friends and infer video quality 
through social learning. On the other hand, frequent social sharing creates direct or indirect 
network effects where a video becomes a fad. For example, when a video goes viral, users have 
strong incentives to watch it so they have something to discuss in social encounters.  
 Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework of our study. Most existing studies on social 
contagion focus on the Manski problem (Manski 1993): distinguishing general social contagion 
from homophily — the tendency of individuals to associate with similar others (Aral et al. 2009, 
Aral and Walker 2011, Bapna and Umyarov 2012). Few of them differentiate between the two 
mechanisms of social contagion: social learning and network effects. Social learning affects 
consumers through the quality information conveyed by peers, whereas the network effects 
                                                 
1 See http://www.comscore.com/insights/Press_Releases/2013/7/comScore_Releases_June_2013_US_Online_Video_Rankings. 
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influence consumers according to the size of the user base. Although these mechanisms lead to 
similar empirical outcome, their implications are vastly different. If social contagion is generated 
mainly by network effects, then seeding strategies, which determine the initial set of targeted 
consumers, would by implication have a strong influence on the success of viral marketing. A 
firm can amplify social contagion and accelerate product purchases by offering introductory 
discounts (Ho et al. 2012). If social learning is the dominant effect, however, seeding would not 
be effective unless the initial consumers generate positive word-of-mouth. Consumers can infer 
that the high demand of their peers is caused by the introductory discount rather than the high 
product quality (Qiu and Whinston 2012). Both cases are theoretically plausible and need to be 
empirically distinguished. 
 
Figure 1. The Conceptual Framework of Social Learning and Network Effects 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to disentangle social learning and 
network effects in the context of online video sharing. Because of the lack of pre-release 
marketing effort, these two types of social contagion are particularly important for 
user-generated content (UGC). Our empirical results suggest that both mechanisms affect the 
diffusion of social media content significantly, with social learning influencing high-quality 
content more and network effects influencing attention-grabbing content more. We find that 
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social learning is more pronounced when consumers are less certain about video quality and for 
videos belonging to unpopular categories. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) examine the incentives of a 
firm to offer low quality products as “pure attention grabbers.” Our study confirms their 
theoretical results: attention grabbers provoke discussions and go viral through network effects. 
The implications derived from studying YouTube can carry over to other consumer choice 
problems as well.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We review related literature in Section 2. In 
Section 3, we outline an analytical model that motivates our empirical hypotheses. Section 4 
describes the YouTube data. In Section 5, we present the identification strategy and empirical 
results. Some applications are explored in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
 Manski (1993) discusses an econometric challenge of identifying social contagion: Is a 
person’s behavior caused by his social reference group, or does it simply reflect the same 
movement in his reference group? The observation that individuals belonging to the same group 
tend to behave similarly might result from social contagion, exogenous contextual effects, or 
homophily.
2
 Failure to account for contextual effects or homophily might lead to an 
overestimation of the effect of social contagion.  
 These confounding effects are difficult to distinguish, and the identification of social 
contagion often requires strong parametric assumption or rich data collection. Aral et al. (2009) 
distinguish influence-based contagion from homophily-driven diffusion using a dynamic 
matched sample of global instant messaging users. Iyengar et al. (2011) distinguish social 
contagion from homophily and exogenous contextual effects in prescribing behavior among 
                                                 
2 Among these three effects, only social contagion can generate “social multiplier” with a positive feedback (Manski 1993). 
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networks of doctors.  
Within the framework of social contagion, studies have been focusing on distinguishing 
social learning from other contagion mechanisms such as saliency effect (i.e., observed choices 
are more salient than alternative choices), and conformity concerns (i.e., the social pressure to 
adopt the choice made by the majority). Cai et al. (2009) use a field experiment to show that 
observational learning, rather than saliency effect, affects customers’ choices. Van den Bulte and 
Stremersch (2004) study different social contagion mechanisms using a meta-analysis of 
publications on new product diffusion and find evidence for status concerns and social-normative 
pressures but not for social learning under uncertainty. Iyengar et al. (2012) differentiate between 
social learning and normative influence in the adoption of a new drug, and find both operate as 
simultaneous yet separate mechanisms for social contagion. Shi and Whinston (2013) study 
observational learning in the context of location-based networks. Moretti (2011) shows that 
social learning is a more important determinant of sales in the movie industry than network 
effects. Our empirical results show that both social learning and network effects are important in 
the context of online videos. This result highlights the difference between movies and online 
videos. Consumers have more precise prior information to estimate the quality of a movie, but 
much less information for social media videos considering the limited marketing campaigns of 
user-generated content. Therefore, it is unlikely that a movie can go viral solely because of 
network effects, but social media videos can. We also depart from the literature by further 
exploring the role of video types on social learning and network effects. Comparing our results 
with those in Morreti (2011), we find that, in social media, attention grabbing videos go viral 
using network effects without high-quality content. The fact that high-quality videos focus on 
social learning and have become more similar to movies is consistent with the trend 
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that social media are imposing competitive pressure on professional videos. From a 
methodological perspective, we apply a two-step bootstrapping method to correct possible 
invalid inferences in a number of applied studies, such as Barro (1977) and Moretti (2011).  
Online WOM, especially online user reviews, has become an important channel of social 
contagion (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2009; Goldenberg et al. 2010). In the 
context of UGC, Susarla et al. (2012) demonstrate that social networks affect economic 
outcomes by structuring the information available to other users, which then influences their 
decisions, perceptions, and behaviors. Goldenberg et al. (2012) show that the stream of people’s 
chatter from social broadcasting networks facilitates social learning among a much broader peer 
group than has traditionally been possible. Although these studies provide evidence of the 
existence of social contagion in the diffusion of UGC, none of them look into the two specific 
contagion mechanisms, social learning and network effects, each of which may have different 
managerial implications.  
For UGC, understanding whether the popularity of the content makes it valuable 
(network effects) or the value of the content makes it popular (social learning) is pivotal. By 
distinguishing between network effects and social learning, our paper contributes to the 
understanding of different social contagion mechanisms in the diffusion of UGC. 
3. A Theoretical Framework of Social Learning and Network Effects on 
YouTube 
A video can go viral either because of social learning or network effects. This section 
examines the different implications of these two mechanisms. We set up two simple analytical 
models incorporating social learning and network effects separately. Testable hypotheses are 
developed accordingly based on the predictions of the two models. 
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3.1 A Model of Social Learning on YouTube 
YouTube videos are experience goods whose quality cannot be fully observed by 
consumers ex ante but can be ascertained upon consumption. Therefore, before consumption, 
consumers are never completely sure about the quality, but they can always acquire useful 
information from friends who have already watched the videos. The literature on observational 
learning (Banerjee 1992) examines the social learning that occurs through observing other 
people’s behaviors. We also consider underlying social networks from which people make 
inferences about the quality of a video based on the information within their social connections. 
We capture the learning process with a Bayesian learning model, where each consumer receives 
feedback from peers and updates the prior belief of the video quality.
3
  
Our theoretical model of social learning is based upon Bayesian learning models 
(Acemoglu et al. 2011), but extending them in one important aspect: we model the probability 
that a consumer watches a video is the product of the probability that he is aware of the video 
and the probability of watching the video conditional on being aware of it (Shi, Rui, and 
Whinston 2013). It’s important to consider the awareness probability explicitly in social media. 
Compared to movie sales studied in Moretti (2011), social media consumption is severely 
restrained by how well consumers know the existence of a video. Because consumers on 
YouTube face an almost infinite choice set, it would be unrealistic to assume that they know the 
existence of each video.
4
  
The decision process for YouTube video consumption over time is described in Figure 2. 
Although Figure 2 depicts only the sequence of events at time 1 and 2, the process proceeds in a 
                                                 
3 Following Banerjee (1992), the timing of consumption is exogenously given, and we do not consider the strategically behavior 
of delaying the decision making process to obtain more feedback.  
4 As of August 2012, on average, about 72 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute, and the number is still 
growing, see http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics.  
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similar manner at time 3, 4, …, T. 
We first describe the decision process, conditional on that consumers are aware of the 
existence of the video. The utility that a representative consumer   obtains from watching some 
YouTube video   is 
                (      )  
where    is the latent quality of the video, and     represents the unobserved taste 
heterogeneity. At time 1, video   is posted on YouTube. Since there is no specific prior 
information pertaining to the video before it is posted, consumers share a common prior on the 
quality of the video, given by 
    (  
        )  
where    is a vector of the observable characteristics of video   before watching.   
   is the 
ex-ante expectation of quality, and     is the precision of prior for video  .  
 
Figure 2. Timeline 
Before making a decision, each consumer observes a conditionally independent private 
signal of the quality: 
A new video is 
published on 
YouTube 
A cohort of 
consumers is aware 
of the video 
Each consumer in the 
cohort receives a 
private signal about 
the video quality 
Each consumer in the 
cohort decides 
whether to watch the 
video 
Another cohort of 
consumers is aware 
of the video 
Each consumer in the 
second cohort 
receives a private 
signal about the video 
quality 
Each consumer in the 
second cohort 
receives feedback 
from the friends  
Each consumer in the 
second cohort decides 
whether to watch the 
video 
The decision making 
process proceeds in 
the same way at time 
3, ... , time T 
1 2 3
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                             (1) 
where     is the precision of consumer  ’s information source for video  . The signal errors     
are independent across consumers. Consumers update the prior according to Bayes’ rule. 
           represents consumer  ’s expected utility of video   at time   given the information 
set at time t,   . Notice that the video is newly published, so no social learning occurs at time 1. 
Conditional on being aware of video  , a consumer chooses to watch it if the ex-ante expected 
utility is no less than the opportunity cost of watching video  ,    . Therefore, if a consumer is 
aware of video   at time  , then he watches video   if  
  [   |  ]  
   
       
  
   
   
       
             
Accordingly, the probability that a consumer watches video   conditional on being 
aware of it at time 1 is: 
     (              )   
(
 
 
 
   
       
  
   
   
       
      
√
   
(       )
  
 
  
)
 
 
 
  
where      is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution.  
We then model the probability that a consumer is aware of video   at time 1, denoted as 
   .     is a function of the characteristics of video   at time 1, such as the video ratings, the 
number of YouTube Favorites, and the number of video comments. The proportion of informed 
consumers for video   at time 1 is given by:        . Given a large number of viewers on 
YouTube
5
, the number of views of video   at time 1 is 
                                                 
5 Over 800 million unique users visit YouTube each month, see http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics. According to the law 
of large numbers, we can calculate the number of video views. If the number of potential consumers is not sufficiently large, 
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                     , 
where   is the number of potential consumers.  
With social learning, consumers have more information at time 2 because they receive 
feedback from friends. The underlying social network         is given by a finite set of 
nodes               and a set of links      . Each node represents a consumer. The 
social connections between the consumers are described by an     matrix denoted by 
           such that: 
    {
             
           
   
Let                   represent the set of friends of consumer  . We assume 
that consumer i has k friends, where         . Among them,    friends have watched the 
video at time 1. These friends communicate to consumer i their ex-post utilities after watching 
the video,    , where m =1, 2, 3, ... ,  .    friends were aware of the video, but decided not to 
watch the video at time 1, and they are indexed by m=     ,     , ... ,      . The friends 
who have decided not to watch the video also provide valuable information: their expected 
utilities are less than the opportunity cost of watching the video. The number of friends who 
were unaware of the video at time 1 is        . 
As a result, at time 2, consumer i's information set consists of the ex-post utilities of some 
friends, the number of friends who decided not to watch the video, and the number of friends 
who were unaware of the video. Combining these three pieces of information, consumer i 
estimates the quality by maximizing the likelihood of the observed evidence: 
  [                             |  ] 
                                                                                                                                                             
Chebyshev's inequality can give us a bound on views.  
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   (   )         
       (  [   |  ]     )      
                   
          
where  (   ) is the likelihood of observing    . The maximum likelihood estimator,     , is 
an estimate of   . It is unbiased and asymptotically normal: 
      (        )  
where       [(
    
   
)
 
] (Amemiya 1973).  
If a consumer is aware of video   at time 2, his expected utility becomes the weighted 
average of the prior mean, his private signal, and the maximum likelihood estimator: 
           
   
           
  
   
   
           
    
   
           
      
Note that as time goes on, consumers place less weight on the prior mean. Because 
consumers receive more information at time 2, the prior becomes a less important factor in the 
decision making process. The probability that consumer   watches video   at time   is: 
     (              )   
(
 
   
           
  
   
       
           
      
√(       )  (           )
 
     )
   
If a consumer is aware of video   at time  , the decision making process proceeds in the 
same way. Consumer   has    friends who decide to watch the video at  ,    friends who 
decide not to watch the video at time  , and         friends who are unaware of the video, 
where              . The probability that consumer   watches video   at time   is: 
     (              )   [
    
               
  
]                (2) 
where    √(    ∑    
 
   )  (        ∑    
 
   )
 
     , and    
   
        
∑    
 
   
. 
The proportion of informed consumers at time   is given by:     =                   , 
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where         is the proportion of uninformed consumers at time    , and     is the 
probability that a consumer is aware of video   at time T. The number of views of video   at 
time   is: 
                      ,                          (3) 
where      . 
A few remarks need to be made here. In the process of social learning,    is the weight 
that consumers put on the ex-ante prior. It is evident that    decreases with  . As time   
grows, the probability of watching videos relies less on the ex-ante prior and more on social 
learning. If the revealed quality of the video is higher than the mean of the ex-ante prior, 
     
  , we call it a positive surprise. If the revealed quality of the video is lower than the prior 
mean,      
  , we call it a negative surprise. Unanticipated variables entering the formulation 
of a model has been documented in a large body of literature (Baillie 1987). Social learning is a 
process of adjusting beliefs about the quality according to the surprises. Thus, we have the 
following proposition:  
Proposition 1. In the presence of social learning, if a positive surprise is sufficiently 
large (     
  ), then    is increasing in  . If a negative surprise is sufficiently large 
(  
     ), then    is decreasing in  .  
Proof. From equation (2), we can obtain: 
        
  (
      
                
    
)   (
    
              
  
)  
If      
   
 
  
(
 
  
 
 
    
) (  
     ) , where    
      
    
 
    
  
> 0, we have 
         . Thus, if a positive surprise is sufficiently large, then    is increasing in  . 
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Similarly, we can show that if a negative surprise is sufficiently large, then    is decreasing in 
 . ■  
Our model shows that consumers learn about the surprise over time, and a positive 
surprise increases the expected quality of the video as time passes. Therefore, the probability of 
watching the video increases. Similarly, a negative surprise reduces the expected quality over 
time, and the probability of watching the video decreases.  
Other things being equal, we consider some video   with a large positive surprise and 
some video    with a large negative surprise. According to equation (3), we find that: 
                                              6 
Therefore, we have the following testable hypothesis from the theoretical prediction:  
Hypothesis 1. In the presence of social learning, the growth rate of views of a video that 
has a positive surprise is higher than the growth rate of views of a video that has a negative 
surprise. 
In our model of social learning, we can also consider the impact of the consumers’ prior. 
The intuition is that the effect of social learning is more pronounced for videos with less precise 
priors. If a consumer is very uncertain about the quality of a video, the value of social learning is 
large: The additional information he learns from his friends should be more valuable than the 
case when he knows the quality precisely. 
Proposition 2. (a) If the positive surprise is sufficiently large,        , is decreasing 
in the precision of the prior,    . (b) Similarly, if the negative surprise is sufficiently large, 
           is decreasing in    .  
Proof. From equation (2), we can obtain: 
                                                 
6 The logarithm growth rates are widely used in economic modeling and empirical study. They are good approximations for 
percentage growth rates. 
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           , 
when the positive surprise (     
  ) is sufficiently large. Part (b) can be proved similarly. ■ 
The incremental probability,        , can measure the effect of social learning. An 
increase in the precision of the prior makes the additional information from friends less valuable. 
Thus, social learning should be more valuable among videos that are less familiar to consumers, 
and we have the following empirically testable Hypothesis 2:  
Hypothesis 2. In the presence of social learning, the positive surprise has a greater 
impact on videos with less precise priors.  
3.2 A Model of Network Effects on YouTube 
Besides social learning, social contagion can also be driven by network effects. Network 
effects in our context refer to only the direct network effect where the utility of watching a video 
directly depends on the number of consumers who have watched the video, irrespective of their 
reasons for the choice of watching the video (Katz and Shapiro 1985). While indirect network 
effects have been widely studied for two-sided platforms (Tucker and Zhang 2010), they are 
beyond the scope of this paper. The underlying mechanism for network effects is different from 
that of social learning. Essentially, network effects are payoff externality, which implies that the 
value of the service depends directly on the consumption choices made by some other consumers. 
For example, a consumer might enjoy discussing a video with his peers. In this case, the actions 
of other consumers do not convey any quality information about the video but still increase the 
consumer’s probability of watching. On the contrary, social learning leverages information 
externality instead of payoff externality. In other words, social learning influences consumer 
decision through the conveyed sentiment towards the video, while network effects affect the 
decision through the total number of viewers irrespective of their attitudes towards the video. 
16 
 
To model network effects, we introduce another component to reflect the impact of total 
number of viewers such that the utility consumer   obtains from watching YouTube video   at 
time T is given by: 
             ∑               
   
   
       (      )  
where                is the number of consumers who have watched the video at time t. The 
consumer derives direct utility from the total number of consumers who have watched the video. 
The parameter   measures the magnitude of network effects. If    , then network effects 
exist. If    , then the impact of network effects is insignificant. For pure network effects 
model, we assume no social learning, and, consequently, consumers do not receive feedback 
from peers.  
Under network effects, the probability that a consumer watches video   at time T is 
given by: 
    
(
 
   
       
  
   
   
       
    ∑               
   
       
√    (       )
 
     )
  
It is evident that    is increasing in T under network effects irrespective of the values of   
   
and   . What matters in the case of network effects is the initial viewer base. With strong 
network effects, a video that shows a negative surprise but has generated more initial views 
because of high ex-ante quality expectation may perform better than a video that shows large 
positive surprise. In fact, if social contagion is purely driven by network effects, surprise does 
not matter, and we should not observe the empirical pattern described in Hypothesis 1.  
 One way to empirically identify network effects is to examine sequential correlation in 
video views such that the views at time t is positively correlated with the lagged cumulative 
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video view,               . However, we would not be able to uniquely identify network 
effects without controlling for social learning. We use a two-stage test to distinguish the two 
confounding mechanisms. Recall that in Hypothesis 1, with social learning, a video with a 
positive surprise has a higher growth rate than a video with a negative surprise. However, under 
network effects, a significant difference in the growth rates resulting from surprises would be 
absent. Therefore, if the empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 1, then it would show the 
existence of social learning. If Hypothesis 2 is also confirmed, it would provide additional 
evidence for social learning. We also look into whether other diffusion mechanisms, such as 
social pressure and conformity concerns, could result in a similar pattern described in Hypothesis 
1 and 2. According to Iyengar et al. (2012), there is no correlation between social conformity and 
product quality. Therefore, the impact of “quality surprise” should be insignificant under social 
conformity.  
In the second stage, we test whether network effects exist using instrumental variable as a 
source of exogenous variation for existing levels of views. If social contagion is purely driven by 
social learning, the growth rate of video views should remain unchanged when the shock does 
not reflect information about video quality. Such uninformative surprises do not incur any social 
learning. However, in the presence of network effects, a negative shock that does not contain any 
quality information reduces the viewer base, and thus leads to a lower growth rate of video views. 
Therefore, we can identify network effects by testing Hypothesis 3. The detailed description of 
the two-stage test is given in Section 5. 
Hypothesis 3. In the presence of network effects, the negative surprise lowers the growth 
rate of video views even if the negative surprise does not reflect information about video quality. 
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4. Data 
To empirically test the theoretical model, we look at new videos that were posted during 
our data collection period. As the world’s largest video viewing and sharing website, YouTube 
has enormous numbers of videos, which makes random sampling infeasible. Instead, we focus on 
the most active providers by selecting the top 1,000 YouTube providers (in terms of total video 
views) identified for June 2011.
7
 We collected a daily panel of data on these providers for one 
month, from March 1, 2012 to March 31, 2012. Our sample includes a total of 302 new videos 
published on March 1, 2012 by these top providers. We use one day as the time unit of analysis 
to capture the fast-changing nature of online videos.  
The provider level data include provider ID, data collection date, date when the provider 
joined YouTube, number of subscribers to the provider’s channel, total views of all the 
provider’s videos, total views of the provider’s channel page, number of videos, number of 
friends, number of subscriptions the provider has to other providers, channel views rank, and 
video views rank. The video level data include video ID, data collection date, date when the 
video is posted, the provider of the video, number of views, category in which the video belongs, 
video length, whether the video has an in-stream ad, average rating, number of times the video is 
favorited by viewers, and number of comments. All videos in our sample were published on 
March 1, 2012. Because YouTube Analytics data is updated daily, the first day in our analysis is 
March 2, 2012. Summary statistics of the video characteristics at the beginning of our data 
collection period are reported in Table 1. We assume that each viewer watches a video only once. 
Although consumers may repeatedly watch a video, the bias caused by repeated viewings is 
small if logs of views are used instead of views (Susarla et al. 2012). Table 2 provides summary 
                                                 
7 In this study, we focus on social learning and network effects given that consumers are aware of the video. We do not study 
how consumers become aware of a video. That is why we select the videos published by the top 1,000 YouTube providers as our 
sample. 
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statistics of the characteristics of our YouTube providers.  
Table 1. The First-Day Video Characteristics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of video views 2,497.20 8,524.969 2 107,628 
Video rating 4.692 0.5066 1.76 5 
Number of times the video being 
favorited by viewers 
139.507 495.910 0 6,800 
Number of comments 384.173 1030.539 0 9,832 
In-stream ads (yes-1, no-0) 0.5359 0.4995 0 1 
 
Some YouTube providers also post their video links on Twitter. We control for these 
personal marketing efforts when estimating social contagion. Using Twitter application 
programming interface (API), we collected a random selected sample of all Twitter data 
containing the key word #YouTube or video. Using the collected tweets, we analyzed the 
included shortened uniform resource locator (URL) link related to YouTube and recovered the 
unique YouTube video ID. Then we used a simple natural language processing on tweet content 
to identify the tweets posted by video providers as new video announcements such as “I 
uploaded a new video …, please check out.” 
Table 2. The First-Day Chanel Characteristics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total views of the provider's channel 
page 
1.32e+07 2.01e+07 3,175,291 1.75e+08 
Total views of all the provider's videos 1.87e+08 2.38e+08 3,690,640 1.55e+09 
Number of subscribers to the provider's 
channel 
298,743.8 459,699.2 9,200 5,109,145 
Number of subscriptions by the provider 
to other providers 
183.6144 1,063.834 0 17,641 
Number of videos 267.9837 289.788 1 969 
Number of friends 16,976.32 22,916.99 0 120,570 
 
5. Empirical Framework 
5.1 Identification of the Surprise 
In our theoretical model, the surprise is defined as the difference between the revealed 
quality and the prior mean,      
  . Following Barro (1977), Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
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(2009), and Moretti (2011), we empirically define the surprise as the difference between realized 
video views and predicted video views at time 1 (March 2, 2012).
8
 In our study, we consider the 
prediction error to be a surprise. More specifically, we argue that YouTube video views on the 
first day can be predicted by the characteristics of YouTube providers (channel). Therefore, we 
use the residual from a regression of first-day log views on the characteristics of YouTube 
providers at time 1 and video category as a measure of video-specific surprise. The residual 
measures the deviation of realized video views from the rational expectation at time 1. The 
residual may change with different functional forms used for the predicted views. Therefore, as a 
robustness check, we test our hypotheses with different regression specifications. 
The characteristics of YouTube providers are reasonable measures of expected video 
quality. YouTube allows consumers to subscribe to the providers they would like to follow. By 
subscribing to a provider, they are informed immediately when the provider posts a new video. 
The prior information about the provider shapes to a large extent a consumer’s expectation of the 
provider’s new videos. 
Table 3. Identification of the Surprise: First-Stage Regression  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
lvviews 0.444*** 0.445*** 0.449*** 0.0952*** 
 
[12.83] [12.89] [13.0] [3.112] 
lcviews 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.291*** 0.0799* 
 
[4.809] [4.798] [4.710] [1.661] 
lvideos 0.0175 0.0176 0.0179 0.0171 
 
[0.564] [0.568] [0.579] [1.512] 
subs 3.26e-08 3.29e-08 
 
4.43e-08 
 
[0.138] [0.140] 
 
[0.530] 
subscriptions 2.71e-06 
  
1.33e-05 
 
[0.0360] 
  
[0.504] 
Constant 1.630 1.629 1.410 5.090*** 
 
[0.684] [0.685] [0.787] [5.886] 
Observations 302 302 302 302 
R-squared 0.545 0.545 0.544 0.528 
t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
                                                 
8 In finance literature, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document a momentum phenomenon: Firms reporting positive earnings 
surprises outperform firms reporting negative earnings surprises. 
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Table 3 illustrates the first-stage regression results of first-day (March 2, 2012) log video 
views on provider characteristics at time 1. The predicted value of the dependent variable 
obtained from this first-stage regression is a measure of expected video quality. The residual is 
used as a measure for surprises to test Hypothesis 1. The channel characteristics include the log 
of total views of channel j’s videos,        ; the log of total views of the provider’s channel 
page,        ; the log number of uploaded videos of the channel,        ; the number of the 
provider’s subscribers,     ; and the number of other providers the provider subscribe to, 
             . The independent variables also include a set of dummy variables indicating the 
video category. Column 1 in Table 3 shows the regression results. Column 2 and 3 indicate that 
the results are robust to other regression specifications.  
 To check the robustness of our measure of surprises, we also use another 
empirical measure of surprises: the difference between realized video ratings and predicted video 
ratings at time 1. Similarly, we regress first-day video ratings on the characteristics of providers 
and use the residual as a measure of surprises. This result is shown in Column 4 in Table 3. The 
robustness test results are shown in Section 5.2 and Section 5.4. We also need to check whether 
the residuals measure surprises rather than simply reflect omitted variables that are observable to 
the viewer but not the researcher. If it is the case, the residual would be systematically correlated 
with viewership. However, we regress log views on the residual at time 1, and find the 
coefficient insignificant (p value = 0.331).  
Figure 3 shows a clear example of videos with different surprises. The figure plots the 
daily video views for a video with a positive surprise (video 2) and a video with a negative 
surprise (video 1). These two videos belong to the same YouTube video category and have 
similar initial views, but experience different growth patterns: Video 2, having positive surprise, 
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has a significantly higher growth rate than video 1, having a negative surprise. The first-day 
views of video 1 and video 2 are roughly the same (    and     respectively). However, at 
the end of our sample period, views of video 1 and views of video 2 are       and        
respectively. As stated in our theoretical model, this striking difference is likely to be caused by 
social learning over time.  
 
Figure 3. Daily Views for Videos with Different Surprises 
5.2 A Test of Social Learning 
5.2.1 The Existence of Social Learning 
According to Hypothesis 1, in the presence of social learning, the growth rate of views of 
a video with a positive surprise is higher than the growth rate of views of a video with a negative 
surprise. If only network effects exist, we should see no significant difference between the 
growth rate of a video with a positive surprise and that of a video with a negative surprise.  
Our empirical approach is based on the literature on treatment effects (Wooldridge 2007). 
The positive surprise is interpreted as the “treatment”, and views of "treated" videos are 
compared to views of the “control” videos with negative surprises.  
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To test whether the difference between the growth rates is significant, we estimate the 
following model using difference-in-difference: 
                        
      (    )    (     )         (4)    
where           is the log of views of video   at time  ,   represents the time period,    
represents unobserved fixed effect of video  , and     includes the characteristics of video   
that change over time, such as        (the video ratings),      (the number of YouTube 
Favorites),         (the number of video comments),        (the log number of uploaded 
videos of the channel),         (the log of total video views of the channel), and      (the 
number of channel subscriptions). We control the marketing efforts of YouTube providers on 
Twitter, which are measured by             , the total number of tweets containing the 
unique YouTube video ID and the word “uploaded”. Unlike the specifications in Duan et al. 
(2009) and Susarla et al. (2012), equation (4) does not contain lags of accumulative views, 
because the lag terms do not help distinguish between social learning and network effects. In our 
context, both social learning and network effects can lead to a positive effect of previous views 
on current views: (1) Consumers learn from other people’s choices. They infer the quality is high 
when they see a larger number of accumulative views. (2) Consumers can obtain a higher utility 
from a larger view base because they enjoy discussing a video with their peers. 
 In the regression,    is a dummy variable indicating whether the surprise of video   is 
positive (    , if the surprise is positive;     , otherwise),     is the expected video 
quality measured by the predicted value of the dependent variable obtained from the first-stage 
regression in Section 5.1, and     is the error term. Note that we expect that    is not 
significantly different from 0 because the expected quality should not change the growth rate of 
video views over time after controlling for other variables in Model (4).  
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 Following the literature on treatment effects (Wooldridge 2007), we make the 
unconfoundedness assumption:      is strictly exogenous. Note that the correlation between 
     and     for any time   and time   causes inconsistency in regression coefficients. 
Thus, we need to control for the time-varying heterogeneity (   ), and the unobserved fixed 
effects in the regression. If the surprise assignment (positive or negative) changes in reaction to 
past outcomes on          , strict exogeneity can be violated (Wooldridge 2007). However, 
because the surprise assignment is determined at time 1 and is independent of the idiosyncratic 
views shocks in period  , strict exogeneity is a reasonable assumption. 
We are interested in the difference-in-difference estimator,   . If     , then the 
difference between the growth rates is positive, supporting Hypothesis 1 and the existence of 
social learning. If     , then the growth rates of video views with different surprises are the 
same, which indicates no significant social learning. 
The fixed effects regression results are shown in Table 4. In the table,             
    . Column 1 shows the results from a regression that includes all the coefficients specified 
in equation (4) except   . In this regression,  ̂         and is significantly positive, which 
confirms Hypothesis 1. Note that in the regression model, after controlling for online WOM, 
such as       ,     , and        , the impact of a positive quality surprise is still 
significantly positive. This suggests that social learning is beyond reading comments and 
reviews.  
As expected, Column 2 shows that  ̂  is insignificant, which implies that the anticipated 
quality does not have a significant impact on the growth rate of video views. This result is 
reminiscent of rational expectations models: only unanticipated factors affect real economic 
variables. Barro (1977) examines the rational expectation monetary models and empirically 
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found that only the unanticipated part of money movements has real effects on the 
unemployment rate.  
Table 4. Fixed Effects Regression of Video Views on Surprises: A Test of Social Learning 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interaction 
        
0.0313*** 0.0271*** 0.0313*** 0.0480*** 0.0218** 0.0176*** 
 
[12.58] [5.041] [3.201] [7.727] [2.248] [30.86] 
rating 0.262*** 0.213** 0.262** 1.542*** 1.105*** 0.206*** 
 
[2.934] [2.301] [2.245] [2.771] [2.652] [2.442] 
favs 0.000110*** 0.000329*** 0.000110* 0.000834*** 0.000134 0.000172*** 
 
[2.920] [3.642] [1.857] [6.157] [0.890] [4.873] 
comment 0.000213*** 0.000124*** 0.000213*** -0.000406*** 0.000423*** 0.000134*** 
 
[7.835] [5.337] [4.544] [-3.369] [4.506] [5.204] 
sum_upload 0.0300 0.0397 0.0300 0.0431 0.0534 0.0241 
 
[0.461] [0.224] [0.211] [0.241] [0.521] [0.390] 
Interaction 
          
0.00134 
 
   
  
[0.702] 
 
   
Observations 9060 9060 9060 1290 3390 9060 
R-squared 0.328 0.384 0.328 0.459 0.564 0.110 
t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Using residuals to measure unanticipated variables (the surprise) has a long tradition in 
macroeconomics and finance. A number of studies use the following two-step regression 
procedure to estimate the effect of the unanticipated variables, such as unanticipated inflation 
(Sargent 1976), unanticipated money growth (Barro 1977), earnings surprises (Hirshleifer, Lim, 
and Teoh 2009), and unanticipated movie quality surprises (Moretti 2011): First, the residuals 
from a separate auxiliary regression are used as a proxy for the unanticipated variable and then 
the residuals are used as an explanatory variable in the equation of interest (Baillie 1987). Simply 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) without adjusting for the extra variance of the generated 
regressor term (the surprise) can yield consistent estimates but invalid statistical inferences 
(Pagan 1984; Wooldridge 2002). The existing literature such as Barro (1977) and Moretti (2011) 
tends to underestimate the standard errors of coefficient estimates. It is crucial to address this 
issue in the context of social media because the data tend to be more noisy. We use the two-step 
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bootstrapping method proposed by Cameron and Trivedi (2005) to obtain proper statistical 
inferences. The asymptotically refined result is presented in Column 3.  
5.2.2 Social Learning and Video Popularity 
Social learning effect differs across video categories. Column 4 and Column 5 in Table 4 
present regression results for subsamples of two categories: “Tech” and “Music.”According to a 
survey by Sysomos Inc. (http://www.sysomos.com/reports/youtube/), Music is the most popular 
category on YouTube, and Tech is the least popular category. We find that social learning is 
more pronounced for “Tech” videos than for “Music” videos. This finding indicates that social 
learning affects videos belonging to unpopular categories more. The implication is that the role 
of social learning becomes more salient in a niche market than in a mass market. Column 6 
shows that the results are robust when we define the surprise as the difference between realized 
video ratings and predicted video ratings.  
A striking pattern in the data is that video views are remarkably skewed. The top 10 
videos account for 47.46% of total views, and the top 30 account for 66.81%. Quantile 
regression analysis is particularly useful when the conditional distribution of video views is 
heterogeneous and does not have a “standard” shape (Koenker and Hallock 2001), to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity and heterogeneous covariates effects. A simple differencing strategy 
used in fixed effects estimation shown in Table 4 is infeasible for quantile regressions since 
quantiles are not linear operators. So we adopt an estimator that is consistent and asymptotically 
normal (Canay 2011) to compute the quantile estimates. 
In Figure 4, we plot the parameter estimates    of the quantile regressions based on 
equation (4). There are nine estimated quantile regressions with 0.1, 0.2, …, and 0.9 quantiles. 
The parameter estimates of the quantile regressions are connected by the solid line, with the 
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shaded area being their 95% confidence intervals. The fixed effects estimate    shown in Table 
4 is plotted as horizontal dashed lines in this figure. We find that the quantile regression 
parameter estimates are significantly positive for all quantiles and decrease with quantiles in 
general. This suggests that the impact of a positive surprise is higher for less popular videos, 
because the same magnitude of positive surprises implies more pronounced social learning for 
less popular videos than for popular videos. Since most of popular videos are published by top 
content creators on YouTube and consumers have high ex-ante expectations on these videos, the 
impact of an additional positive surprise (social learning) is relatively small. For example, 
financed by venture capitalists and grants from YouTube, Maker studios produced a popular 
sketch comedy show called “AsKassem” for YouTube (Miller 2011). Consumers who have 
watched AsKassem #1 - #70 form high expectations on the quality of the new episode #71. 
Tucker and Zhang (2011) find a similar result: Popularity information benefits niche products 
with narrow appeal more than the mainstream products. Figure 4 also indicates that the panel 
data model with fixed effects tends to underestimate the impact of a positive surprise for less 
popular videos and tends to overestimate the impact for popular videos. 
 
Figure 4. The Estimates of Quantile and Fix Effects Regressions 
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5.2.3 Social Learning Effects over Time 
 An underlying assumption of Regression Model (4) is that the effect of social learning is 
constant. The time trend is assumed to be linear. However, the effect of social learning may vary 
over time. We estimate Model (5) using fixed effects (FE). The dummy variable      indicates 
the time period t. We are interested in the coefficient   .  
             ∑       
  
   
       
    ∑   
  
   
               (5) 
Table 5. Estimating the Effect of Social Learning over Time Using Model (5) 
VARIABLES FE VARIABLES FE VARIABLES FE 
      
        0.0661***          0.0465***          0.0049*** 
 [9.293]  [11.79]  [7.645] 
        0.0664***          0.0431***          0.0094*** 
 [11.57]  [11.31]  [7.396] 
        0.0652***          0.0396***          0.0048*** 
 [11.92]  [10.86]  [7.003] 
        0.0643***          0.0354***          0.0072*** 
 [11.68]  [10.31]  [6.612] 
        0.0646***          0.0319***          0.0052*** 
 [13.32]  [10.03]  [6.163] 
        0.0617***          0.0269***          0.0051*** 
 [12.97]  [9.736]  [5.776] 
        0.0594***          0.0229***          0.0074*** 
 [12.61]  [9.459]  [5.420] 
        0.0581***          0.0183***          0.0041*** 
 [12.87]  [8.999]  [5.022] 
        0.0547***          0.0141***          0.0064*** 
 [12.58]  [8.014]  [4.551] 
         0.0503***          0.0089***   
 [12.21]  [8.132]   
Observations 
R-squared 
9060 
0.385 
  
t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5 shows that    is large when   is small. This implies that the effect of social 
learning is more pronounced in earlier periods. Our finding is consistent with the empirical facts 
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in Tang, Gu, and Whinston (2012): Most videos receive the majority of views in the first four to 
five days after being posted, and only marginal views thereafter. 
5.2.4 Further Analysis on Social Learning 
An issue with our empirical test is that Proposition 1 depends on the condition that the 
surprise is sufficiently large. In the previous estimations, the sample is divided into two groups in 
terms of positive or negative surprises. We check for robustness by further dividing our sample 
into four equally sized groups depending on the magnitude of the surprise. For example, Group 1 
includes the videos with the lowest 25% of the level of the surprises, and Group 4 includes the 
videos with the highest 25% of the level of the surprises. Then we estimate the following 
specification: 
                       
    ∑         
 
   
       
where   , for g = 2, 3, 4, are dummy variables indicating the video belongs to the surprise group 
g, and   , for g = 2, 3, 4, are coefficients on     . Table 6 reports the results, which are 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 4.  
Table 6. Fixed Effects Regression under Different Surprise Groups 
 
Fixed Effects Regression 
     0.0424*** 
 
[31.95] 
     0.0131*** 
 
[17.31] 
     0.00412*** 
 
[2.920] 
Observations 9060 
R-squared 0.486 
t-statistics in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
According to Table 6,           . This is consistent with our intuition: In the 
presence of social learning, the views of a video with a higher level of surprise should increase 
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more rapidly. We also conduct two hypothesis tests: the null hypotheses are δ₄=δ₃ and δ₃=δ₂. 
The F-statistics are 271.72 and 9.47, respectively, which implies that we can reject both null 
hypotheses with a significance level of 0.05. As a result, we can conclude that the social learning 
effects are stronger with larger positive surprises. 
We also check if quality (rather than social learning) itself can explain all the findings. A 
high-quality video can easily be forwarded by people who happen to view them first to their 
friends. Through request and compliance, more and more people will view the video and realize 
the true quality. However, this cannot explain our result: the impact of a positive quality surprise 
is significantly positive. We find that when the ex-ante expectation of the quality is extremely 
high, a high-quality video may have a negative surprise that can slow down its growth rate, 
because the true quality fails to fulfill the expectation.  
Hypothesis 2 indicates that social learning is more important for videos with less precise 
priors. To test the hypothesis, we estimate the following model: 
                       
             
    (        )    (           )       (6) 
where        is a measure of the prior precision of video  . Here we propose the total views of 
the provider’s channel page on the first day (March 2, 2012) to empirically identify which videos 
have more precise priors. YouTube users upload videos to their YouTube channels. A consumer 
has a better idea of the quality of a new video published by a high-ranking channel (in terms of 
channel page views) because the consumer is more likely to have watched another video 
published by the same channel before. In this case, videos published by higher-ranking channels 
have more precise priors. We divide the sample into two equally sized groups by channel views: 
the high-ranking group and the low-ranking group. If a video belongs to the high-ranking group, 
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then the dummy         ; otherwise,         . 
Table 7. The Effect of Prior Precision on Social Learning 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
interaction        0.0152*** 0.0333*** 0.0129*** 0.0294*** 
 
[12.15] [9.581] [10.76] [10.20] 
tprior             0.0113*** 0.0482*** 0.0236*** 0.0481*** 
 
[15.15] [25.47] [30.88] [20.96] 
tdprior (           ) -0.0151*** -0.0523*** -0.0162*** -0.0466*** 
 
[-8.142] [-10.16] [-9.050] [-8.592] 
rating 0.154* 
 
0.0371 0.124 
 
[1.744] 
 
[0.445] [0.701] 
favs 0.000136*** 
 
6.40e-05* 5.84e-05 
 
[3.677] 
 
[1.823] [0.882] 
comment 0.000160*** 0.000871*** 0.000265*** 0.00104*** 
 
[5.943] [18.99] [10.43] [22.66] 
sum_upload 0.0157 
 
0.186*** 0.473*** 
 
[0.246] 
 
[3.058] [3.542] 
Observations 9060 9060 9060 9060 
R-squared 0.353 0.253 0.222 0.244 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The coefficient of interest here is    in the regression model (6). Table 7 illustrates that 
the empirical evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2. In the table,                , and 
                   . In Column 1, we find that the coefficient on        ,  ̂ , is 
       , which is significantly negative. We can consider two identical videos with the same 
positive surprise except for the fact that the first belongs to the high-ranking group and the 
second belongs to the low-ranking group. In the presence of social learning, a negative    
implies that the growth rate of views of the second video is higher than the growth rate of views 
of the first video. In other words, social learning has a greater effect on videos with less precise 
priors, which supports Hypothesis 2. Column 2 indicates that the estimate of    is robust to a 
different specification.  
We also show that the regression results are robust to different measures of the prior 
precision. We use two other measures of the prior precision: the number of subscribers and the 
variance of the ratings of the channel’s past videos. If more YouTube users subscribe to a 
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channel, consumers are more certain about the quality of the videos from that channel. Similarly, 
we divide the sample into two equally sized groups, based on subscribers rank. If a video belongs 
to the high-ranking group, then the dummy         ; otherwise,         . We also 
calculate the variance of the ratings of the channel’s videos at day 1 (March 2, 2012), and divide 
the sample into two equally sized groups: If a video belongs to the low-variance group, then the 
dummy         ; otherwise,         . If the variance is low, the quality of the videos from 
that channel is more homogeneous, and consumers are more certain about the quality. Column 3 
and Column 4 in Table 7 show that the coefficient on         is significantly negative. 
Different measures of the prior precision do not affect our key results. 
5.3 A Test of Network Effects 
In this section, we test the existence of network effects on YouTube using the presence of 
in-stream ads as a source of exogenous variation for existing levels of video views. YouTube 
in-stream ads run only on partner videos. Only successful content creators are qualified for the 
partner program, and videos published by them might contain in-stream ads. It is reasonable to 
assume that the presence of in-stream ads is exogenous in our context. It is possible that 
advertisers are more likely to use the channels that have higher viewership and higher quality 
videos. However, all of our sample videos are published by the top providers on YouTube, and 
all of them are partners. As a result, the presence of in-stream ads is not likely to be correlated 
with video quality. Empirically, we find that the presence of in-stream ads is not significantly 
correlated with viewership in our sample. Stock et al. (2002) propose a method based on the 
first-stage F statistic for detecting weak instruments. For an instrument to be reliable, the 
first-stage F statistic in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression should be greater than 8.96 
when the number of instruments is one. We run a first-stage regression on our instrument 
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variable and find that F statistic = 303.2 > 8.96. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that 
the presence of in-stream ads is a weak instrument.  
Network effects are identified by isolating the surprises caused solely by the presence of 
in-stream ads. YouTube bundles video content with in-stream ads, which are intrusive to many 
consumers.
9
 The presence of in-stream ads is a negative shock that can reduce the viewer base. 
If network effects exist on YouTube, the negative shock lowers the growth rate of views at time 
1, and then it further lowers the growth rate at time 2. As time goes on, we should see a 
significantly negative self-reinforcing feedback loop. However, such a negative shock does not 
contain any information of the video quality. If social learning is the sole form of social 
contagion, the Bayesian learning process remains unchanged. The negative shock can decrease 
the viewership at time 1, but the long run growth rate of video views should not be affected 
significantly (no self-reinforcing feedback loop).
10
 If a consumer is shown an ad before the 
video, one may think this could impact social learning in that this would result in lower 
consumer satisfaction and more negative word of mouth. However, the additional information 
about ads from the peers is redundant. When consumers make decisions on whether to watch the 
video, they know whether the video contains an ad.
11
 In summary, if there exists only social 
learning with network effects absent, the presence of ads is a transitory shock that does not have 
significant long run effect. If network effects exist, the presence of ads results in a negative 
self-reinforcing feedback loop.   
We re-estimate model (4) to test network effects, using 2SLS regression, and the 
                                                 
9 Wilbur (2008) estimates a two-sided model of the television industry and shows that viewers tend to be averse to advertising. 
Anderson and Gans (2011) study an advertising-sponsored content provision model and interpret advertising clutter as a "price" 
paid by viewers who enjoy the content. 
10 Let video j is a video without an ad, and video j’ is a video contains an ad. Other things being equal, we can obtain 
                                                                                                from 
our model of social learning.  
11 When consumers are shown an ad before the video, they can choose to switch to other videos. It is equivalent to not watching 
the video.  
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in-stream ads      as instrument for the surprise dummy   .      is a dummy, where 
       if the video has an in-stream ad, and        otherwise. Generally, 2SLS is used to 
avoid endogeneity. However, we use the first-stage regression to isolate the surprises that are 
caused solely by the shock of in-stream ads. We are interested in the coefficient    in the 
regression model (4). If Hypothesis 3 (the presence of network effects) is supported, we expect 
to see that     , which implies that negative surprises lower the future views without 
revealing any quality related information. If     , then network effects are insignificant.  
Table 8. A Test of Network Effects: 2SLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
interaction        0.00670** 0.00667** 0.0036*** 
 
[2.540] [2.509] [2.583] 
rating 0.436*** 0.438*** 0.430*** 
 
[5.213] [5.248] [5.210] 
favs 0.000170*** 0.000174*** 0.0002*** 
 
[4.794] [5.587] [5.582] 
comment 0.000138*** 0.000141*** 0.0001*** 
 
[5.425] [5.853] [4.831] 
sum_upload -0.00957 
 
-0.0198 
 
[-0.157] 
 
[-0.334] 
Observations 9060 9060 9060 
R-squared 0.241 0.241 0.241 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the test.    is the coefficient on             (    ). 
Column 1 and 2 represent different model specifications. We find that  ̂  is significantly 
positive under all specifications. The result suggests that social learning is not the only causal 
social contagion on YouTube, and network effects also play a critical role. The test confirms 
Hypothesis 3: the existence of network effects on YouTube. Column 3 shows that the results still 
hold when the surprise is defined as the difference between realized video ratings and predicted 
video ratings. 
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6. Application: How to Go Viral? 
Social learning and network effects outline two ways that a video could go viral and gain 
success. Through examining the most popular videos on YouTube, we are able to categorize 
them into two distinct groups: the group consists of videos that feature high quality, engaging 
scenes, articulated story lines (high-quality videos), and the other group of videos often include 
questionable behaviors that deviate from social norms yet still gain tremendous popularity 
(attention grabbers). The recent “Pussy Riot” incident in Russia serves as a good example of a 
typical attention grabber. This Russia-based feminist rock band protested against the political 
scene in Russia through unorthodox musical performances and produced YouTube videos that 
went viral overnight. It is worth noting that Pussy Riot did not gain international fame through 
their musicality per se; instead, most viewers were drawn to those videos out of curiosity and 
were interested in the messages the music carried. 
One type of strategy often adopted is the inclusion of controversial elements in videos. 
Such instances often provoke controversy and stir heated discussion revolving around those 
contents. This type of videos tends to attract critical reviews from both sides of the spectrum; 
viewers feel strongly and emotionally attached to the video in either extremely positive or 
negative ways. In contrast to those quality-oriented productions, the goal of attention grabbers is 
primarily to attract attentions or promote ideas. Intuitively speaking, we would not expect too 
much social learning effect to take place for the popularity of this type of video. In an analytical 
model, Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) shows that a firm can earn higher profits by employing pure 
attention grabbers with positive probability. Similarly, we propose that, as suggested by their 
discussion-provoking nature, videos with attention grabbing content can initiate higher network 
effects, and viewers find it valuable to watch them because these videos allow them to engage in 
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discussions with their social contacts. Therefore, we hypothesize that this type of videos gains 
popularity mostly through network effects as opposed to social learning:  
Hypothesis 4. (a) Network effects are more pronounced for videos with attention 
grabbing content. (b) Social learning is more pronounced for high-quality videos.  
To test Hypothesis 4, we estimate the following two models: 
                       
             
    (            )    (               )       (7) 
and 
                         
               
     (          )     (             )       (8) 
where            is a measure indicating whether video   is a video with attention grabbing 
content, and          is a measure indicating whether video   is a high-quality video. Here we 
use review rank and rating rank to empirically identify videos with high quality or attention 
grabbers. We define high-quality videos as videos with both large numbers of comments and 
high ratings, and attention grabbing videos as videos with high comment rank but mixed ratings. 
The co-existence of extremely high and extremely low ratings often suggests controversy. 
Specifically, if both the number of comments and the rating of video   at the end of our sample 
period rank among top     of total videos, then it is considered as a high-quality video, and 
the dummy           ; otherwise,           . If the number of comments of video   at 
the end of our sample period rank among top    , but the rating is in the lowest    , then it 
is a video with controversial content, and             ; otherwise,             .  
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Table 9. High-Quality Videos vs. Attention Grabbers 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
                0.0145***   
 
[6.330] 
  
               
0.368** -0.0208 
  
[2.014] [-0.281] 
rating 0.0307 0.0525 0.188 
 
[0.393] [0.238] [1.295] 
favs 0.000145*** -0.000621* 0.00034*** 
 
[4.416] [-1.672] [4.309] 
comment 0.000140*** 0.000853*** 1.50e-06 
 
[5.821] [10.21] [0.0169] 
sum_upload 0.0342 0.0715 -0.164 
 
[0.603] [0.378] [-1.254] 
Observations  9060 9060 9060 
R-squared 0.193 0.117 0.161 
t-statistics in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To study the network effects for different videos, we estimate the regression model (7) 
using 2SLS. Similarly, we instrument the surprise dummy    using the in-stream ads     .    
in equation (7) is the coefficient of interest.      means the impact of network effects is 
larger for attention grabbing videos. Column 1 of Table 8 presents the regression results. We find 
that    is significantly positive, supporting Hypothesis 4(a). Our result suggests that videos will 
be more likely to go viral through network effects if they provoke controversy and stir heated 
discussion. This is consistent with some experimental evidence: Content that evokes high-arousal 
emotions (i.e., awe, anger, and anxiety) is more viral (Berger and Milkman 2012). This finding 
can help YouTube providers craft contagious content and produce viral videos.  
To study social learning, we first estimate regression model (8) without using an 
instrument variable. In Column 2 of Table 9,     is the coefficient on              . We 
find that     is significantly positive, which suggests that social contagion is more pronounced 
for high-quality videos. However, it does not provide sufficient evidence for social learning 
because social contagion can be driven by network effects as well. Therefore, we re-estimate 
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model (8) using      as an instrument variable. The result is presented in Column 3 of Table 9. 
We find that             and is not significant, which indicates that high-quality videos do 
not have higher network effects. Combining the results shown in Column 2 and 3, we can 
conclude that social learning is more pronounced for high-quality videos. In other words, 
Hypothesis 4(b) is also supported. Our empirical results of hypothesis testing provide supports 
for the strategic use of attention grabbers (Eliaz and Spiegler 2011). 
7. Conclusions 
 Our paper uses a combination of analytical modeling and empirical estimation to study 
social learning and network effects in the context of social media. We find that social media 
content consumption is affected by both social learning network effects. A straightforward 
implication of our study is that YouTube should take social learning and network effects into 
account when fostering the growth of video views. Our results suggest that social contagion on 
YouTube is driven by both social learning and by network effects. As the influence of YouTube 
on our society, education, entertainment, and lifestyle increases, more and more organizations, 
including government agencies, TV networks, commercial companies, universities, etc., are all 
seeking for their presence and influence in social media. Our findings provide valuable insights 
as how to achieve this objective with videos on YouTube. 
 Considering that the amount of a traditional marketing campaign of YouTube content is 
limited, consumers rely heavily on advice from others to make decisions about watching videos. 
Social learning and network effects differ from traditional marketing activity in their social 
multiplier effect (Trusov et al. 2009). From a managerial perspective, YouTube can play a much 
greater role in encouraging the creation of original content because, as it nurtures and subsidizes 
individual content creators, the multiplier effect of both social learning and network effects 
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extends their reach.
12
 We also find the influence of social learning is stronger for unpopular 
videos, for videos in unpopular categories, and for videos with less precise priors.  
Previous literature has focused on distinguishing social contagion from homophily, but 
only provides limited insights into how to disentangle social learning and network effects in the 
context of UGC. In this paper, we develop an empirical framework that allows us to make a 
causal inference about the presence of social learning and network effects on YouTube. More 
specifically, by applying a theoretical model, we examine the existence of social learning and 
network effects using a unique data set from YouTube. Our paper also makes methodological 
contributions for consistent and efficient estimation using noisy social media data. 
Although in this study we only focus on social learning and network effects on UGC sites, 
our tests are relatively generalizable and can be practically carried out by practitioners in social 
media. We categorize the most popular videos on YouTube into quality-oriented videos and 
attention grabbing videos, and find that videos with attention grabbing content initiate higher 
network effects than quality-oriented productions. These findings provide a nuanced view of 
how YouTube providers can produce viral videos.  
While this study has highlighted the importance of social learning and network effects, 
our work does not consider the effect of network characteristics and network topological 
structure on social contagion (Ghose et al. 2012). Further work could incorporate network data to 
examine the effect of network structure and tie strength on social learning and network effects. 
Another limitation of this study is that we only use data on top providers. Whether and to what 
extent the same patterns apply to unpopular providers need further examinations. 
                                                 
12In fact, YouTube is providing creators with resources and opportunities to improve their skills, build larger audiences, and 
make more money through its partnership program. As a New York Times article reported (Miller, 2011), a sketch comedy show 
called “AsKassem” is financed by grants from YouTube. The amount of content on YouTube covered by partnership agreements 
has risen steadily, to 10% of the total videos.   
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